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// WORKED EXAMPLEWHERE THE RISK SITS

Corporate Benefit: Why a Lender Reads the Board Minutes

The group borrows. Each company answers for itself.

BY MICHAEL SHANG · SIXTEEN YEARS IN COMMERCIAL BANKING · UPDATED

// THE SHORT ANSWER

Corporate benefit is the question a lender puts to every company that will guarantee or secure a debt it did not itself borrow: what does this company gain? The answer has to come from that company's own directors, because the law treats each company in a group as separate and their duties run to it, not to the group. A guarantee the directors could not justify can be challenged later by the company, a liquidator or an outside shareholder, often when the lender most needs it. So the lender asks for the reasoning to be written down, in the board minutes, before the money moves.

BASIS  Practitioner judgment from sixteen years in commercial banking, set out in How Bankers Think (Highbank Press, 2026). Every borrower on this site is a composite constructed for teaching, not a client. The market is mid-market commercial lending as practised in New Zealand and Australia; where a convention differs elsewhere, the page says so.

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Issue 03 — Kauri Dairy Holdings. The patriarch is retiring. The bank hears about the succession plan from the accountant first. Your call first, then the senior banker's.

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// 01 — WHY EACH COMPANY ANSWERS FOR ITSELF

A business owner sees one business. The law sees a holding company, an operating company, a property company and perhaps a company that holds the brand, each with its own assets, creditors and directors. When the group borrows, the lender wants every company with assets behind the loan. But a company that guarantees another's debt takes on a liability for money it does not receive, and its directors must be able to say why that serves the company they sit on.

The duty is framed the same way in each market. UK directors must act in the way they consider, in good faith, most likely to promote the success of the company. Directors in New Zealand and Australia must act in good faith in what they believe to be, or in, the company's best interests. Each refers to the company, not to the group. A director who signs a subsidiary's guarantee because the parent asked, without asking what the subsidiary gains, has not done what the duty requires.

// 02 — HOW BENEFIT IS SHOWN

Benefit is usually indirect, and directors are entitled to count indirect benefit. The reasons that recur are the guarantor's dependence on the group's funding for its own working capital and investment, its trading with group companies, the shared treasury, systems and management it would otherwise pay for, and the plain fact that its business may not survive the group's failure. A guarantee fee paid by the borrower adds a direct benefit. Against these the directors weigh the size of the guarantee beside the company's own resources and whether the company stays solvent with it in place.

Two markets give directors more room inside groups. New Zealand lets a director of a wholly owned subsidiary act in the parent's best interests if the constitution expressly permits it, and a partly owned subsidiary's director do so with the prior agreement of the other shareholders as well. Australia gives directors of a wholly owned subsidiary a similar position where the constitution authorises it, they act in good faith in the parent's interests, and the subsidiary is not insolvent and is not made so. The UK has no such provision.

The room narrows as solvency weakens. The UK Supreme Court held in 2022 that once directors know or ought to know that the company is insolvent or bordering on insolvency, they must give weight to creditors' interests; courts in Australia and New Zealand have long recognised a similar duty. A guarantee that tips a company over cannot be justified by benefit to the group.

// 03 — THE EXAMPLE

A distribution group, constructed for this page, refinances its debt with a US$32m facility at the holding company. The lender asks three subsidiaries to guarantee it and grant security. Their positions, in figures that are the example's:

Owned Net assets What it gets from the facility
Subsidiary A 100% 14 working capital line, 6 drawn
Subsidiary B 80% 9 nothing directly; owns the warehouse
Subsidiary C 100% −2 losses funded by the parent
Each asked to guarantee 32

Subsidiary A is the easy case. Its own trading depends on the US$6m line inside the group facility, and the minute says so. Subsidiary B has a 20% outside shareholder, a former owner who kept a stake. Its directors cannot rely on the wholly owned provisions, and in New Zealand acting in the parent's interest would need that shareholder's prior agreement. The lender asks for the minority holder's written approval and, failing that, limits B's guarantee to a sum its directors can justify from B's own position: its warehouse is let to group companies, and the rent depends on the group surviving. Subsidiary C already has a deficit of US$2m and lives on the parent's funding. A US$32m guarantee would deepen a deficit that is already there, and its directors are in the zone where creditors' interests weigh most. The lender leaves C out and tests whether A and B carry enough of the group's earnings and assets without it.

// 04 — HOW IT DIFFERS FROM FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Corporate benefit is a question about directors' duties, and it arises with any guarantee for another's debt. Financial assistance is a statutory rule about one kind of transaction: a company helping someone buy its own shares or its holding company's. In Australia and New Zealand an acquisition target's guarantee of the buyer's loan needs both answered: a whitewash or statutory procedure does not show that the target benefits, and benefit does not replace the procedure. In the UK, private companies no longer need the procedure, which leaves corporate benefit doing more of the work.

Benefit also differs from authority. Company law in each market lets an outsider assume, broadly, that a company's officers have acted properly, so a lender is not defeated by an internal irregularity it could not see. The protection is lost by knowledge: in Australia, for example, a person who knew or suspected that an assumption was wrong may not rely on it. A lender that has read the group's accounts and knows a guarantor is in deficit cannot treat the paperwork as a shield.

DEFINED IN ONE PARAGRAPH → · THE UPSTREAM GUARANTEE → · FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE →

// 05 — WHERE IT DECIDES A FILE

Before drawdown, the lender's lawyers ask for each guarantor's constitution, certified board minutes, often a shareholder resolution approving the guarantee, and sometimes a director's solvency certificate. In New Zealand a guarantee whose value is more than half the company's assets can be a major transaction, which needs a special resolution of shareholders. The minutes that hold up are specific: they name what this company gains and why it remains solvent. A minute copied across ten companies with the names changed records that the directors signed, not that they thought.

The test comes later, if a guarantor fails. UK insolvency law, for example, does not set aside a transaction at an undervalue where the company entered it in good faith for its business and there were reasonable grounds for believing it would benefit the company. The board minute written at signing is the evidence of exactly that.

THE BANK'S LAWYERS AND YOURS → · CONDITION PRECEDENT → · GUARANTOR COVERAGE TEST →

// SOURCES

The documents the statements on this page rest on. Each was opened and checked when cited.

  1. UK Companies Act 2006, section 172 — duty to promote the success of the company — Frames the director's duty by reference to the company and makes it subject to rules requiring creditors' interests to be considered — sections 01 and 02.
  2. Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), sections 128, 181 and 187, Federal Register of Legislation, compilation in force 19 September 2026 — Sets the good-faith duty to the corporation, the wholly owned subsidiary provision with its constitution and solvency conditions, and the loss of the statutory assumptions by a person who knew or suspected they were wrong — sections 01, 02 and 04.
  3. UK Insolvency Act 1986, section 238(5) — transactions at an undervalue — Bars an order where the company acted in good faith for the purpose of its business with reasonable grounds for believing the transaction would benefit it — section 05.

// QUESTIONS PEOPLE ASK

What is corporate benefit in a guarantee?
It is the benefit to the company giving the guarantee, as distinct from the group or the borrower. Because directors owe their duties to their own company, they need a reason grounded in that company's interests to make it liable for someone else's debt: access to group funding it relies on, trading with group companies, shared services, a guarantee fee. The reasons are recorded in the board minutes approving the guarantee, which the lender keeps.
Does a wholly owned subsidiary need corporate benefit to guarantee its parent's debt?
Its directors still owe their duties to the subsidiary. In New Zealand and Australia, the statute lets them act in the parent's interests if the subsidiary's constitution expressly allows it, and in Australia only while the subsidiary is solvent and not made insolvent by the act. The UK has no equivalent, so the benefit to the subsidiary itself must be found. Lenders in every market still ask for minutes recording the reasons.
Can shareholders approve a guarantee that lacks corporate benefit?
Shareholder approval helps. Lenders often ask for a shareholder resolution because it can authorise or ratify what the directors do and answers objections from the owners. It does not solve everything. It cannot make an insolvent company solvent, and the insolvency rules a liquidator uses to challenge a guarantee given for too little in return turn on the company's solvency, not on its shareholders' consent.
What happens if a guarantee is given without corporate benefit?
It may be challenged, usually when the guarantor or the group has failed. The company, a liquidator or an outside shareholder may argue that the directors breached their duties and that the lender knew enough to be affected, or a liquidator may attack the guarantee under insolvency law as a transaction for too little in return. Neither outcome is certain, and both are disputes a lender would rather avoid by asking the questions at signing.

THE IN-TRAY · ONE MINUTE

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THE NUMBER · THE LOAN · PROTECTION

A company fails. One lender is secured over the plant; the other is unsecured. The receiver's realisations, after costs, are below. There are no preferential claims.

Secured lender owed
US$10m
Unsecured lender owed
US$5m
Realised from the plant
US$9m
Realised from everything else
US$2m

What does the unsecured lender recover?

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7 MORE ON THE LOAN · PROTECTION →WHERE DO YOU READ FROM? THE PLACEMENT →